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以下為英文譯文：

Abstract: Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Kazan to attend the 16th BRICS leaders' meeting. Earlier, Xu Po Ling, Director of the Russian Economy Room at the Institute of Russian East European and Central Asian Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a senior fellow with Beijing Club for International Dialogue, pointed out that cooperation against sub-sanctions is an important task for BRICS cooperation. Also, although the cooperation between China and Russia in the field of trade continues to show a solid trend, the pace of investment cooperation is relatively slow. He is in favor of expanding to the multilateral level to promote the comprehensive deepening of China-Russia cooperation with a broader vision and richer resources.

I have two points to make in this session. First, compared to the assessment of security, experts seem more optimistic about economic prospects. There is a rather pessimistic outlook when it comes to building new security structures and maintaining existing peace orders. The escalating confrontations among major powers, coupled with the pressure on smaller countries to choose sides, underscore the urgent need to establish a new security order as numerous red lines are being crossed.

On the economic front, although cooperation among BRICS countries still faces many challenges, each speaker proposed suggestions or plans for achieving collaboration and development. I believe that the common logic between security and economics lies in the fact that in conflicts, the risks of major power confrontations and small states choosing sides are very high. However, when establishing cooperative frameworks, especially those outside the U.S. dollar system, smaller nations can benefit from both sides. The efforts of BRICS in the economic sphere illustrate that the economy is a driving force for continued development, and the economic prospects of BRICS appear bright.

We have always advocated that BRICS should not become an antagonistic organization but rather serve as an alternative option. The extent to which this alternative can provide development opportunities for developing countries, particularly those in the Global South, will determine the depth, breadth, and potential success of BRICS. Cooperation within the BRICS framework aims to build an alternative system that may initially be less efficient. As people have comfortably lived within the existing system for a long time, the sudden systemic changes pose challenges. This initial inefficiency requires the support of a shared vision—nations must offer top-down support to offset the costs of business participation and mitigate risks during periods of low efficiency.

Second, all the proposals put forward by the experts follow a logical progression of “from simple to complex” and “from the specific to the detailed”. We should not rush to establish a fully alternative settlement currency at the outset, as the weighting and pricing mechanisms of a common currency are highly complex. Instead, as Director Tang Xiaoyang suggested, we can first achieve short-term gains to attract countries to participate, lay the foundation for further cooperation and the development of settlement systems. Cooperation among the Global South through the BRICS mechanism is, in fact, a revolution. BRICS serves as a revolutionary platform aimed at addressing current direct sanctions and secondary sanctions that deprive us of and threaten our development opportunities. For China and Russia, direct sanctions are not the main issue; rather, the web of secondary sanctions established by the U.S. through its power network poses a significant threat, as it deprives developing countries of their advantages. Thus, countering secondary sanctions is a crucial task for BRICS cooperation.

I believe one possible approach is to establish clauses that ask Western companies and banks that conduct business in Global South markets to be subject to exclusive clauses. Companies that participate in sanctions against BRICS countries should be barred from profiting in the markets of Global South nations. This would ensure that BRICS countries are willing to build a coalition against secondary sanctions. This is an essential and long-term mission.

Public data on the level and recent changes in China-Russia economic and trade cooperation are often inaccurate. In fact, data provided by Chinese customs frequently underestimates the volume of China-Russia trade. Last year, the total trade volume between China and Russia was reported as $240.1 billion, but this figure does not include re-exports to Russia via countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and the UAE. Including these would likely bring the total trade volume closer to $300 billion. Last year, 72% of Russia’s foreign trade came from Asia, many of which trade with China through direct and indirect ways, as well as intermediary production. This suggests that the scale of China-Russia economic and trade cooperation could be much larger than the current data indicates.

From January to July this year, although the total trade volume between China and Russia showed a growth trend, China’s exports to Russia declined slightly (-1.2%). In August, Russia’s energy exports to China decreased, but trade volumes of pipeline gas and liquefied natural gas still far exceeded those of last year due to Russia’s accelerating exports to China in the first and second quarters. August’s changes are related to China’s domestic economic situation, but the impact is limited; the main factor remains the settlement issues related to China’s exports to Russia.

On the bilateral level, there is good news for China-Russia economic and trade cooperation. Before 2022, China-Russia economic and trade cooperation mainly followed a government-led model with large enterprises executing projects and small enterprises following suit. This is a security-driven trade model. After 2022, private entrepreneurs seized opportunities and actively engaged in trade, shifting the China-Russia trade model from a purely security-driven approach to one driven by both security and market forces. This dual-driver approach is the source of the rapid growth in China-Russia trade volumes in 2022, 2023, and likely 2024.

However, a long-standing issue in China-Russia trade is that while trade cooperation proceeds smoothly, investment cooperation lags behind, partly due to the 2006 Agreement between the governments of China and Russia on promoting and mutually protecting investments. This year, during Premier Li Qiang’s official visit to Russia, the joint statement noted that negotiations on this agreement are essentially concluded, with the new agreement expected to be signed by the end of the year. If investment cooperation projects are implemented, trade will be driven by investment and the output will increase significantly—this is positive news.

In reality, the need for China-Russia cooperation and resolving respective internal issues are increasingly difficult to address on a bilateral level, necessitating a shift towards multilateral level. The internal and external challenges and conditions for cooperation faced by China and Russia are relatively severe. Regarding external conditions, the U.S.-China competition is effectively a showdown. The U.S. attempts to stymie China’s development through a series of actions in China's surrounding regions, while China responds by opening up and aligning with other countries to promote re-globalization as a counter to U.S. suppression. However, the current global order is in a state of flux, transitioning between the post-Cold War period and the formation of a new order. As the two leaders from both sides noted in their discussions last year, the world is undergoing “great changes unseen in a century” and we need to jointly promote its development. The key point is that although U.S. hegemony is in decline, we should not expect a rapid collapse because its economy is resilient. China is growing, and Russia is reclaiming its status as a major power, but neither can yet play the leading role in future policymaking.

Both Russia and China face internal challenges and require a peaceful development environment to address domestic issues. Specifically, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict persists without an end in sight. Sanctions from the U.S. and the West are tightening, presenting severe challenges to economic growth.

China faces numerous challenges, with domestic economic uncertainties leading to a decline in private investment. Although China’s overall investment grew by 3.6% and exports by 7% from January to July, and the Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) has been gradually rising, people and entrepreneurs generally find it harder to make profits, and expectations for the future remain weak. Many entrepreneurs in Southern China have turned to the Russian market as exports to the West decline. I was particularly surprised to see that exports from Foshan City, Guangdong Province, in the first half of this year decreased by 24.6%.

China is at a critical stage of economic restructuring and problem-solving. Although we face weakened expectations, the primary challenge is that the U.S.-China competition is at a crucial point. How can this problem be solved? China-Russia cooperation offers opportunities for their respective development. Over the past two years, Russia has utilized the China-Russia economic and trade cooperation platform to achieve growth, while some Chinese businesses have also gained substantial returns by exploring the Russian market. However, bilateral cooperation now faces problems that are difficult to resolve at the bilateral level.

China has set a five-year goal in its overall strategic layout to establish a high-quality, socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics by 2029. We plan to address internal issues through reform and external challenges through expanded opening-up. In short, it can be described as “fighting the battle of 2029.”

As we move towards openness and multilateral cooperation, we must recognize that China and Russia have different focal points, but we share many common goals. China’s current multilateral cooperation mechanisms mainly focus on Asia-Pacific economic and trade frameworks, including the SCO, BRICS, ASEAN, and RCEP. We are also developing the Central Asia 5+1 cooperation mechanism and promoting China-Africa cooperation. Russia’s core platforms include the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the SCO. Currently, Russia is focusing on promoting BRICS cooperation and values G20 and China-Africa cooperation. President Putin has also proposed a new Eurasian security framework.

While China and Russia have different ways of addressing internal issues and enhancing ties with international partners, we share common objectives in opposing U.S. hegemony, promoting multipolarity and forming cooperation mechanisms among Global South countries. As such, we can oppose the secondary sanctions alliance on multilateral platforms; otherwise, we cannot resolve settlement issues in China-Russia economic and trade cooperation, nor fulfill our commitments to providing opportunities to other developing countries. Therefore, I believe that moving from bilateral to multilateral cooperation is the best way to address this issue, as it can drive changes in the global order and shape an international environment beneficial to both of us.

（發(fā)言摘自徐坡嶺教授在9月11日舉行的“中俄合作：推動多極世界”對話會上的發(fā)言。來自中俄兩國的20多位專家學者齊聚莫斯科，深入討論了全球政治安全格局、金磚國家合作、全球南方發(fā)展以及中俄關系等重要議題。此次對話會由北京對話和俄羅斯國際事務委員會聯(lián)合主辦）